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UNDER THE "USE" 
PROVISION OF 
18 U.S.CA. SECTION 
924(c) (1) (1984). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In a unanimous deci-
sion, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, inBaileyv. Unit-
edStates, Il6S.Ct.50l (1995), 
held that in order to sustain a 
conviction, under 18 U.S.c.A. 
section 924( c)(1 )(1984), for 
"use" of a firearm while com-
mitting a drug related offense, 
the prosecution must demon-
strate that the defendant "ac-
tively employed" the firearm 
during the offense. The Court's 
interpretation ofthe term "use" 
in the context of section 
924( c)(1) makes numerous 
courts' previously articulated 
standards for "use" in obtain-
ing a conviction obsolete. 
Furthermore, the Court's rul-
ing, while affecting the inter-
pretation of "use" under section 
924( c)(1), leaves the compan-
ion "carry" provision open for 
future interpretation. 
In May 1989, Roland 
Bailey ("Bailey") was stopped 
for a traffic violation and was 
ordered from his vehicle when 
he failed to produce a driver's 
license. As he stepped out of 
the vehicle, the police officer 
saw Bailey put something be-
tween the seat and the console. 
A subsequent search of the 
vehicle revealed a single bullet 
and thirty grams of cocaine in 
the driver's compartment as 
well as a large amount of cash 
and a loaded nine millimeter 
handgun in the trunk. Bailey 
was charged with several 
counts, including "using or car-
rying" a firearm in violation of 
section 924( c)( 1), which pro-
vides in relevant part, that any-
one convicted of "using or 
carrying" a firearm during the 
commission of any drug traf-
ficking or other violent crime 
shall be committed to prison for 
not less than five years. 
Bailey was convicted by 
a jury on all counts and was 
given a prison sentence which 
included a consecutive five year 
term for the section 924( c)( 1 ) 
conviction. Bailey appealed, 
claiming that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support a con-
viction under section 924( c)(l). 
The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, however, 
rejected Bailey's argument and 
held that the jury could reason-
ably infer that the gun had been 
used by Bailey to protect his 
drugs and drug money as well 
as to facilitate narcotic sales. 
In the second ofthe two 
consolidated cases, Candisha 
Robinson ("Robinson") was 
arrested and charged with sev-
eral counts, including a viola-
tion of section 924( c)( 1), after 
the police executed a search 
warrant on her apartment fol-
lowing a drug related investiga-
tion. The search resulted in the 
discovery of an unloaded, 
holstered twenty-two caliber 
Derringer handgun along with 
almost eleven grams of crack 
cocaine which were found in-
side a locked trunk in a bed-
room closet. Robinson was 
convicted on all counts and giv-
en a prison sentence which, sim-
ilarto Bailey's, included a five 
year term for the section 
924( c)(1) violation. The dis-
trict court denied Robinson's 
motion for judgment of acquit-
tal and Robinson appealed to 
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the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia which re-
versed the conviction, holding 
that under the wording of the 
statute a person cannot be con-
victed for violating section 
924( c)( 1) unless he or she actu-
ally uses the firearm in connec-
tion with a drug offense, even if 
he or she had intended to use it 
but did not. 
In order to resolve the 
inconsistencies in the applica-
tion of section 924( c)(1), the 
court of appeals consolidated 
the two cases and agreed to 
rehear them en banco Inadivid-
ed opinion, the court rejected 
the previously used multi-fac-
tor standard and replaced it with 
an accessibility and proximity 
test. Thus, the court paid little 
attention to the use of a firearm 
and instead concerned itself 
only with its accessibility. The 
court found, in both cases, that 
the firearm was readily accessi-
ble and close enough in prox-
imity to the drug related crime 
to sustain a section 924( c)(1) 
conviction. Because of the con-
flict among circuit courts' ap-
plication of section 924( c)( 1), 
the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States granted certiorari in 
order to clarify the meaning of 
the term "use" under the stat-
ute. 
According to the Court, 
the court of appeals erred in 
applying an accessibility and 
proximity standard; it did agree, 
however, that "use" meant more 
than mere possession. Bailey, 
116 S. Ct. at 506. The error in 
the accessibility standard, the 
Court pointed out, was that un-
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der that standard every posses-
sion of a firearm would poten-
tially trigger section 924( c)( 1) 
and this was not how the Court 
interpreted Congress' intention. 
Id. If Congress had intended a 
violation of section 924( c)(1) 
for possession of a firearm in 
connection with a drug offense, 
it would have provided for this 
in the statute, as it did in sec-
tions 922(g), 922G), 922(k) and 
other gun-crime statutes. Id. 
The issue for the Court, there-
fore, was to determine what 
evidence must be presented in 
order to trigger the "use" provi-
sion of section 924( c)(1). Id. 
The Court began its 
analysis with the language of 
section 924( c)(1), noting that 
judges should pay close atten-
tion to the wording of a statute, 
especially when it describes the 
elements of a crime. Id. at 506-
07. The language of section 
924( c)( 1) criminalizes "using" 
or "carrying" a firearm in con-
nection with a drug offense. 18 
U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(1984). 
The Court explained that if the 
term "use" was meant to be read 
broadly, as the court of appeals 
had done, there would be no 
room left for the "carry" provi-
sion to have any separate and 
distinct implication. Id. at 507. 
The Government, however, ar-
gued that Congress' intention 
was to combine the "use" and 
"carry" prongs of the statute, 
making its broad reading of 
"use" appropriate. Id. at 508. 
The Government supported its 
argument by pointing out that 
the original statute, written in 
1968, provided for two sepa-
rate sections, one for the "use" 
prong and one for the "carry" 
prong. Id. at 507. Congress 
then, in 1984, combined the two 
sections into one. Id. The Court, 
however, disagreed that Con-
gress' intention in combining 
the two sections was to strip 
"use" and "carry" of their inde-
pendent and distinct meanings. 
Id. at 508. The Court opined 
that "[i]f Congress had intend-
ed to deprive 'use' of its active 
connotations, it could have sim-
ply substituted a more appro-
priate term "possession" to cov-
er the conduct it wished to 
reach." Id. 
To clarify the meaning 
of "use" under section 
924( c)( 1), the Court provided a 
few examples of what consti-
tutes "using" or "actively em-
ploying" a firearm. Brandish-
ing, displaying, bartering with, 
striking with, and obviously fir-
ing or attempting to fire a fire-
arm were examples which the 
Court found violative of the 
"use" prong of section 
924( c)(1). Id. The Court went 
on to say that even the mention 
of a firearm, intended to bring 
about a change in circumstance, 
or the silent presence of a gun 
could constitute a "use" under 
the statute. Id. 
Storing a gun near drugs 
or drug proceeds, however, 
would not be considered a "use" 
without the requisite active 
employment. Id. Without ac-
tive employment, the storage is 
no more than mere possession 
which the Court had already 
determined does not satisfy the 
statute.ld. To resolve the ques-
tion of what to do with an of-
fender who keeps a gun close 
by, to grab if necessary, the 
Court pointed out that the Gov-
ernment has other means avail-
able to reach such a situation. 
Id. at 509. One example is the 
"carry" prong of section 
924(c)(1). Id. 
As a result ofthe Court's 
interpretation, it was compelled 
to rule that in neither of the 
cases at bar was the gun active-
ly employed, not while in the 
trunk of the car and not while in 
a holster in a locked trunk on 
the floor of a closet. Id. The 
Court, thus, reversed the con-
victions under the "use" prong 
of section 924(c)(l) and re-
manded the cases back to the 
district court to determine 
whether the "carry" prong 
could sustain the convictions. 
In reversing the convic-
tions in Bailey, the Supreme 
Court of the United States es-
tablished a more discernible 
standard for courts to use in 
determining whether a drug traf-
ficker has "used" a firearm un-
der section 924( c)( 1). The fire-
arm must have played an active 
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role in the crime in order to 
constitute a violation of the 
"use" prong of section 
924(c)(1), whether it was actu-
ally fired by the defendant or 
merely mentioned in order to 
intimidate another party. Con-
versely, if the firearm was 
present unbeknownst to any 
party present at the crime other 
than the defendant, it appears 
that the Court would not con-
sider the firearm "used" in the 
crime. The decision which the 
Supreme Court of the United 
States reached in Bailey offers 
little in the form of precedent 
available on appeal to those in-
dividuals who have been con-
victed under similar circum-
stances for a section 924( c)( 1 ) 
violation. The Court made no 
mention of making the decision 
retroactive. Bailey does, how-
ever, serve to change the stan-
dard by which courts will ana-
lyze the "use" provision of the 
statute. This change could con-
ceivably have a detrimental ef-
fect on society. In the future, 
drug dealers will not fear the 
ramifications of possessing a 
firearm while engaged in their 
illicit acts, specifically the ex-
tra five year sentence associat-
ed with them if they are caught. 
Thus, a gun will continue to be 
a common tool of the trade for 
drug dealers. This, of course, 
assumes that those engaged in 
the drug trade were ever con-
cerned with the regulation to 
begin with. 
- Kevin Barner 
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